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THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE AND
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 1493: FILLING THE
AMERICAN GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION VOID
I. INTRODUCTION
Global warming is a distant relative of the pollution to which
Americans have become accustomed. Carbon dioxide ("C0"), the
chief pollutant that causes global warming,1 will not blanket the
horizon in clouds of smoke, nor will it poison our drinking water.
In fact, scientists claim that increased levels of atmospheric CO2
only raised the earth's temperature approximately one degree
Fahrenheit during the twentieth century.2 To the uninformed,
warmer weather always sounds desirable. A "growing consensus"
of scientists, however, sees things differently.3 Many experts
claim that this miniscule temperature shift has caused the
earth's climate to become increasingly volatile.4 Recent studies
have shown that glacial melt in the arctic has picked up tremen-
dously,5 super-charged hurricanes are becoming more common,6
1. The "greenhouse effect" is a natural phenomenon whereby "greenhouse gases-
primarily carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide"-trap the sun's heat inside the
earth's atmosphere. EPA: Global Warming-Climate, http://yosemite.epa.gov/OAR/global
warming.nsf/content/Climate.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). Global warming occurs when
anthropogenically elevated levels of these greenhouse gases trap an increased amount of
heat inside the atmosphere. See id. This increased heat raises the earth's surface tempera-
ture. See id.
2. See COMM. ON THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS 16 (2001) available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10139.html. [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE]. The National Re-
source Council conducted a study on climate change in 2001 at the White House's behest.
See id. at vii. The Council estimated that the earth's surface temperature has risen be-
tween 0.70 and 1.50 Fahrenheit in the last century. See id. at 16. It attributed this increase
to augmented levels of atmospheric CO, produced by human activities. See id. at 1.
3. See Zachary Coile, Top Court Gets Case on Global Warming: California's Key Law
on Auto Emissions at Stake in Ruling, S.F. CHRON., June 27, 2006, at Al.
4. See Jeffrey Kluger, The Tipping Point, TIME, Apr. 3, 2006, at 34, 35.
5. See, e.g., Richard A. Kerr, A Worrying Trend of Less Ice, Higher Seas, 311 SCI.
1698, 1698 (2006) ("Some of the glaciers draining the great ice sheets of Antarctica and
Greenland have sped up dramatically, driving up sea level and catching scientists un-
awares."); see also Doug Struck, Inuit See Signs in Arctic Thaw: String of Warm Winters
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and pacific island nations have watched a rapacious ocean swal-
low the ground beneath their feet.7 More troubling, some experts
believe these regional upsets could represent merely the initial
signs of climate change.' Due to the potentially catastrophic dan-
ger posed by global warming, many national governments have
passed laws designed to reduce the amount of CO 2 emitted in
their countries.9 The United States government, however, has not
passed any such laws. 10
The lack of a federal regulatory scheme to slow climate change
has placed the onus of addressing this global problem on the
slight shoulders of state governments. In recent years, many
state governments have passed legislation targeted at harnessing
CO 2 emissions, and other states have formed regional partner-
ships in order to limit emissions on a wider geographical scale. "
While these endeavors might serve to bridge the gap between
state regulation and a national regulatory scheme, they face a
number of challenges that stand in the way of their success. Ul-
timately, the federal government must intervene to effectively
combat an environmental crisis as massive as climate change.
Alarms "Sentries for the Rest of the World," WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2006, at Al.
6. Many scientists indirectly blame global warming for the destruction Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita wreaked on Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kluger,
Global Warming: The Culprit?, TIME, Oct. 3, 2005, at 42, 43 ("For years, environmentalists
have warned that one of the first and most reliable signs of a climatological crash would be
an upsurge in the most violent hurricanes, the kind that thrive in a suddenly warmer
world.").
7. See Nick Squires, Pacific Paradise Is Disappearing Beneath Waves, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (Eng.) Mar. 18, 2006, at 15 (reporting the travails of the Tuvalu islanders,
who may have to abandon their country because of rising sea levels).
8. See Kerr, supra note 5, at 1701.
9. Take, for instance, the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement which "requires
signatory nations to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions to a level 7 to 10 percent below
what they were at 6 years ago." Richard A. Posner, Efficient Responses to Catastrophic
Risk, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 511, 516 (2006). See generally MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT (1999) (providing an in-depth analysis of the Kyoto
Protocol). In September 2006, governmental leaders from Europe and Asia further raised
the emissions bar by tentatively vowing to reduce CO, emissions below those mandated by
the Kyoto Protocol. See Aoife White, Emissions Targets Set at Helsinki Summit, YAHOO!
NEWS, Sept. 11, 2006, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060911/ap-on-re-eu/summit-climate
-change.
10. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
1262 (2d ed. 2006) ("In the United States, federal effort has centered almost exclusively on
voluntary reduction programs.").
11. For a searchable database of state programs that address global warming, see Pew
Center on Global Climate Change, State and Local Net Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduc-
tion Programs, http://www.pewclimate.org/states.cfm (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
[Vol. 41:567
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
This article will critically examine the two most promising
subnational attempts to combat global warming. Part II will pro-
vide a detailed description and analysis of the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative, a regulatory scheme created by a coalition of
northeast states that imposes limits on CO 2 at the interstate
level. Though the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative exemplifies
the type of ingenuity necessary to counteract global warming, it
faces inherent geographical constraints that will limit its effec-
tiveness. Part III will focus on the benefits of and conflict sur-
rounding California's aggressive greenhouse gas law, Assembly
Bill 1493, which could potentially cut CO 2 emissions from motor
vehicles by a sizeable margin. Before Assembly Bill 1493 can take
effect, however, it must leapfrog two legal obstacles, both of which
threaten to invalidate the bill. Despite the considerable chal-
lenges that will hamper any sort of attempt to fight a transna-
tional problem on a subnational level, these two efforts will, if
nothing else, provide the federal government with a template
upon which it can design a comprehensive regulatory scheme
when it is finally forced to address global warming in the future.
II. THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
A. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative's Background and
Ultimate Objectives
In April 2003, New York Governor George Pataki contacted the
governors of eleven other northeastern states to gauge interest in
forming a regional partnership aimed at controlling CO2 emis-
sions. 12 The response was overwhelmingly positive, and four
months later state representatives had already formulated an ac-
tion plan designed "to develop a regional cap-and-trade program
covering carbon dioxide emissions from power plants." 3 Eventu-
ally, seven states committed to participating in an emissions re-
duction scheme they coined the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
12. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/about.htm
(last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
13. Id. The cap-and-trade program applies to any "fossil fuel-fired stationary boiler,
combustion turbine, or combined cycle system" that "serves an electricity generator with a
nameplate capacity equal to or greater than 25 [megawatts]." REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE MODEL RULE §§ XX-1.2(bj), -1.4(a) (Reg'l Greenhouse Initiative 2006) available
at http://rggi.orgdocs/model-rule 8_15_06.pdf [hereinafter MODEL RULE].
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tive ("RGGI"). 14 The RGGI's objectives are to reduce regional CO,
emissions to 1990 levels by 2009 and to maintain that emissions
level through 2014.1" By 2018, the agreement requires the par-
ticipants to lower regional emissions by ten percent.' 6
On August 15, 2006, the RGGI organizers released a Model
Rule intended to serve as a uniform set of regulations that par-
ticipating state agencies could adopt in order to implement the
RGGI. 17 The Model Rule delineates the RGGI's cap-and-trade
model, which places a hard cap on CO 2 emissions and forces pol-
luters to procure enough emissions allowances to cover their CO 2
output.'" The Model Rule initially caps regional emissions at 121
million tons of CO, and the RGGI will create enough allowances
to cover this level of pollution.' 9 Each state will receive an emis-
sions budget-a share of allowances relative to its emissions out-
put-and may then distribute the allowances to emitters. 20 If
14. See Seven Northeast States Launch Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, ENV'T
NEWS SERV., Dec. 20, 2005, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/dec2005/2005-12-20-05.asp.
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont
originally comprised the RGGI's seven signatories. See id. Although Massachusetts and
Rhode Island did not elect to participate in the RGGI, they may join the regional consor-
tium at any future time. See id. More recently, Maryland became the eighth state to sign
onto the RGGI. Anthony DePalma, Pollution Pact Gets Maryland as 8th Member, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at A22.
15. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE-OVERVIEW, 1 (2005) available at http:/
www.rggi.org/docs/mou-rggi-overview 12 20 05.pdf.
16. Id.
17. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Model Rule & Amended Memorandum of
Understanding, http://www.rggi.org/modelrule.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). The Model
Rule is the product of months of public comment review and substantive revision to the
Draft Model Rule, which the signatory states originally released on March 23, 2006. See
id. For a brief summary of the revisions, see RGGI Group Issues Rule with Easier Offset
Use, MEGAWATT DAILY, Aug. 16, 2006, at 9, available at 2006 WLNR 15084924.
18. Press Release, Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, States Reach Agreement on Pro-
posed Rules for the Nation's First Cap-and-Trade Program to Address Climate Change
(Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://rggi.org/docs/model-rule-release81506.pdf. The
RGGI provides companies with three avenues to cover their CO, emissions. A plant may
either purchase allowances from other facilities, purchase allowances from its state gov-
ernment, or engage in offsets projects outside of the energy sector. Press Release, Office of
Governor M. Jodi Rell, Governor Rell Says Conn. Taking Critical Steps on Energy Inde-
pendence and Environmental Protection (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.ct.gov/
governorrell/cwp/view.asp?Q=307886&A=1761.
19. REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 2 (2005),
available at http://rggi.org/docs/mou_12-20-05.pdf.
20. Id. at 2-3. Note, however, that each state has agreed to dedicate twenty-five per-
cent of its allocated allowances to "consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose [s]." Id. at
6. Such purposes include, among other things, promoting "energy efficiency" and mitigat-
ing "electricity ratepayer impacts" caused by the CO2 cap. Id. Each state will presumably
sell the withheld allowances in order to fund these public energy initiatives. See Final
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companies have excess allowances, they may sell them to power
plants that do not have enough credits to cover their emissions. 21
The RGGI gives energy producers an economic incentive to de-
velop CO 2 reduction technology; the less CO2 a facility emits, the
less allowances it must obtain.22
B. The RGGI Under the Microscope: Advantages and
Shortcomings
1. The Flexibility of Offset Projects Lowers Compliance Costs for
Emitters
One of the RGGI's main advantages lies in the flexibility it
provides polluters to meet their allowance requirements. Unlike
the Clean Air Act's ("CAA") pioneering cap-and-trade program to
reduce sulfur dioxide ("SO2") emissions,23 the RGGI allows electric
power plants to acquire allowances in a variety of ways. The
CAA's sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade program is a rigid regulatory
scheme; polluters must buy enough market allowances to cover
their sulfur dioxide emissions. Though SO2 polluters can reduce
emissions from their plants in a variety of ways, they are limited
to intra-plant mechanisms of emissions reduction.24 No such limi-
tation exists in the RGGI's cap-and-trade approach because pol-
luters have a multitude of extra-plant methods at their disposal
by which they can reduce CO 2 emissions.
Facilities, via "offset projects," can choose the most cost-
effective manner to meet their allowance requirement.2" For in-
stance, the Model Rule rewards plants with allowances if they en-
courage end-use energy efficiency, capture and dispose of meth-
RGGI Model Rule Sets Stage for Battles over Emissions Credits, CLEAN AIR REP., Aug. 24,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 14597052.
21. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, supra note 15.
22. See Anthony DePalma, Fears of Energy Price Increase Delay 9-State Pollution
Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at B4.
23. Clean Air Act §§ 401-416, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2000) (delineating a national
cap-and-trade program to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions).
24. Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility Sector's
Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 322 (2001) ("[A] utility is free to choose among competing compliance
approaches, including scrubbing, switching to lower sulfur coal, blending coals with differ-
ent sulfur contents, and shifting load to units that emit less sulfur."). Notice, however,
that a facility's contribution to emissions reductions derives solely from limiting its own
plant's emissions. See id.
25. Seven Northeast States Launch Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 14.
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ane released from landfills, or reforest property.26 If a company
finds it inefficient to simply purchase market allowances, it can
engage in one or many of these offset projects in order to gain ad-
ditional allowances. Moreover, the Model Rule does not geo-
graphically confine power generators who would like to pursue
such projects outside of the signatory states. 27 Emitters may en-
gage in offset projects anywhere in the United States. 2' The wide
variety of projects, in addition to the lack of national geographical
constraints, "gives businesses [increased] flexibility to meet emis-
sion reduction goals at the lowest costs."29
Though these offsets may not constitute greater than 3.3% of a
facility's reported emissions,3" the percentage of allowances a
company can acquire through offset projects increases if tradable
allowances reach a threshold price. If the price per allowance ex-
ceeds seven dollars for a twelve-month span, offset allowances
may comprise up to five percent of generators' CO 2 emissions.31 If
the price per allowance rises to over ten dollars for a twelve-
month span, electricity producers will have an additional year to
meet their compliance obligations,32 may utilize offsets for up to
ten percent of their emissions,33 and may use offsets from an in-
ternational trading program.34
26. MODEL RULE, supra note 13, § XX-10.3(a)(1). See generally Margaret A. Yowell &
Jessica K Ferrell, Using Carbon Sequestration Projects to Offset Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 20 (2005) (exploring the viability of reducing CO, emis-
sions via various means of carbon sequestration).
27. MODEL RULE, supra note 13, § XX-10.3(a)(2).
28. Id. If an emitter chooses to oversee an offset project in a non-signatory state, a
regulatory agency of that state must enter into a memorandum of understanding with the
state in which the emitter operates, agreeing, among other things, to "perform audits of
offset project sites, and report violations" of certain Model Rule provisions. Id. § XX-
10.3(a)(2)(ii). The Draft Model Rule originally stated that "one CO 2 offset allowance
w[ould] be awarded for two tons of demonstrated reductions in CO2 emissions .. .from a
CO, emissions offset project that was undertaken within any [s]tate that is not a
[p]articipating [sitate." PUBLIC REVIEW MODEL RULE DRAFT 03/23/06, § XX-10.7(a)(1)(i)(b)
(Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative 2006), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/public-re
viewdraft-mr.pdf. The revised Model Rule no longer discounts offset projects outside of
the signatory states. MODEL RULE, supra note 13, § XX-10.3(a)(2)(ii).
29. The Nature Conservancy, Northeastern Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), http://www.nature.org/initiatives/climatechange/strategies/artl6919.html (last
visited Nov. 6, 2006).
30. MODEL RULE, supra note 13, § XX-6.5(a)(3)(i).
31. Id. § XX-6.5(a)(3)(ii).
32. Id. § XX-6.5(a)(3)(iii).
33. Id. § XX-10.3(b)(2).
34. Id. § XX-i.2(af).
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The member states recognized the global ubiquity of CO2,35 and
thereby allowed emitters the flexibility to pursue offset projects
anywhere in the nation. This geographical freedom will help sta-
bilize the price of emissions allowances. As available allowances
decrease and demand increases, power generators may scour the
globe for offset program opportunities. Aside from the environ-
mental benefits of international offset programs, allowing offset
allowances to cover a larger portion of emissions will presumably
stabilize the price of non-offset market allowances.36 Stabilization
of these allowances safeguards electricity generators' profit mar-
gins in a C0 2-regulated environment. Safeguarding electricity
producers' profit margins will, in turn, ensure that consumers do
not bear the brunt of CO 2 emissions compliance in the event that
non-offset market allowances become scarce.37 Indeed, the RGGI
organizers estimate that the cap-and-trade system will raise
"residential [electricity] bills by $3 to $21 annually"-a seemingly
negligible price increase.3"
2. The RGGI as a Model for Other Regional Efforts
Unfortunately, the RGGI's actual reduction of global CO2 emis-
sions will probably be negligible at best. With the exception of
New York and New Jersey, which respectively rank ninth and
35. See R.T. Pierrehumbert, Climate Change: A Catastrophe in Slow Motion, 6 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 573, 580 (2006) ("The atmosphere truly is a global commons with respect to carbon
dioxide, making emissions trading schemes far more benign than would be the case for
pollutants, such a mercury, which have locally lethal impacts.").
36. If the price of sulfur dioxide allowances under the federal cap-and-trade program
is any indicator of CO, allowance prices under the RGGI's scheme, CO. prices should re-
main relatively stable: "As of the end of 2002 .... reduction of [sulfur dioxide] was ahead
of schedule-down 41% from 1980-with the market price for emission allowances signifi-
cantly lower than the dire predictions made by industry critics prior to the program's im-
plementation." Grinning Planet, Why Mercury Was Not the God of "Cap and Trade"
(2004), http://www.grinningplanet.com/2004/02-12/cap-and-trade-pollution-credits-eco.htm
(emphasis added).
37. See Press Release, Office of Governor M. Jodi Rell, supra note 18 ("The agreement
is expected to have a minimal impact on the price of energy for consumers. It . . . con-
tain[s] provisions to control the price of 'allowances' if there are unanticipated impacts on
energy costs.").
38. RGGI Group Issues Rule with Easier Offset Use, supra note 17; see also Conserva-
tion Law Foundation, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.clf.org/programs/
cases.asp?id=341 (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (citing MARC BRESLOW & EBAN GOODSTEIN,
IMPACT OF THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI) ON OVERALL BUSINESS
OPERATING COSTS IN RHODE ISLAND 3 (2005), http://www.clf.org/programs/cases.asp?
id=341 (follow "recent study" hyperlink) (noting that the RGGI would result in saving a
typical residential customer $100 in electricity costs annually)).
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seventeenth among the states in greenhouse gas emissions, the
six other states in the RGGI all rank in the forties.39 Because the
northeast states produce relatively little CO2, the CO2 reductions
realized through the RGGI will not markedly decrease CO2's at-
mospheric content. The real value of the RGGI, however, lies not
in its contribution to global CO 2 reductions, but in the prototype it
provides for other regional trading programs.40
Other states have already begun to form regional regulatory al-
liances which could potentially mirror the RGGI's structure.
Take, for instance, the West Coast Governors' Global Warming
Initiative ("WCGGWI"), an alliance which consists of California,
Oregon, and Washington. 41 Among the objectives of the WCGGWI
is the development of "a market-based carbon allowance pro-
gram."42 In the WCGGWI staffs report to the Governors, it rec-
ommended that "the West Coast states should become formal ob-
servers to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative."43 The staff
recognized the tremendous advantages of observation, in that the
WCGGWI "could benefit greatly from tracking the progress of the
Northeast states' exploration of the policy and economic issues
that arise when designing a regional carbon market."4 Unlike
39. See BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF
AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 2 (2004). "Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont produce approximately 3 percent of total U.S.
emissions." Id. at 138.
40. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI): GOALS, PROPOSED TASKS, AND
SHORT-TERM ACTION ITEMS 1 (2003), http://rggi.orgtdocs/actionplanfmal.pdf (noting that
the RGGI may "serve as a platform or model" for future emissions programs in other
states). The governors of the participating states also consider the RGGI a model on which
the federal government could eventually base a national trading scheme. See, e.g., Press
Release, NT Office of the Governor, Codey Announces Landmark Regional Agreement to
Combat Global Warming (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.state.nj.us/cgi-
bin/governor/njnewsline/view article.pl?id=2851 ("'Ultimately, the success of this model
will lead the way to a national program to cut greenhouse gas pollution and reduce the
threat of global climate change.'"); see also Press Release, Governor Ruth Ann Minner,
Governor Minner and Six Other Governors Announce Agreement on Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.state.de.us/governor/news/2005/
12december/122005rggi.shtml ("'I also see the potential for this program serving as a na-
tional model.'").
41. West Coast Governors' Global Warning Initiative, http://www.ef.org/westcoastcli
mate (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
42. Id.
43. WEST COAST GOVERNORS' GLOBAL WARMING INITIATIVE STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE GOVERNORS 14 (2004), available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/westcoast/
documents/2004-11final-report/2004-11-18_STAFFRECOMMENDS.PDF.
44. Id.; see Laura H. Kosloff et al., Outcome-Oriented Leadership: How State and Lo-
cal Climate Change Strategies Can Most Effectively Contribute to Global Warming Mitiga-
tion, 14 WIDENER L.J. 173, 181 (2004) ("Subsequent governments can learn from policies
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the RGGI, where most of the member states do not significantly
contribute to global CO 2 emissions, the three states that make up
the WCGGWI rank seventh in the world in aggregated CO 2 out-
put.45 With the guidance that the RGGI will surely provide, part-
nerships such as these could form a viable patchwork of inter-
state initiatives to control CO 2 emissions.
3. Limitations that the RGGI Cannot Surmount
Though the RGGI presents many exciting advantages, it still
falls short of a federal CO 2 regulatory program because of indi-
vidual states' susceptibility to pressure from industrial opponents
of regulation. In late 2005, shortly before the northeast states
were to sign the formal RGGI agreement, Massachusetts and
Rhode Island pulled out of the RGGI, caving "to pressure from
large corporations that own dirty coal-fired power plants and see
the program as a threat to their profits."46 Massachusetts Gover-
nor Mitt Romney insisted that the RGGI include price ceilings for
energy producers, in order to ensure that power plants would not
have to pay excessive amounts to cover their CO2 emissions.47 The
signatory states, however, refused to accede to Romney's de-
mand.4" The RGGI organizers regarded price caps as an industry-
friendly safeguard that would obfuscate the RGGI's purpose-to
force emitters to develop technology capable of reducing CO 2 out-
put.49 Massachusetts and Rhode Island's behavior exemplifies the
type of inconsistency that will hinder the effectiveness of the
RGGI.
and measures applied elsewhere and will have a better understanding of the social, politi-
cal, environmental, and economic outcomes. Therefore, the role of states is often one of
leadership; by implementing and evaluating policies they can reduce the learning curve
for other states or the federal government to adopt similar policies.").
45. WEST COAST GOVERNORS' GLOBAL WARMING INITIATIVE STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE GOVERNORS, supra note 43, at 4.
46. Conservation Law Foundation, supra note 38; see also Chelsea Conaboy, Concerns
Raised About Regional Emissions Plan, CONCORD MONITOR, Dec. 1, 2005 (reporting Mas-
sachusetts's Governor Mitt Romney's hesitation to sign the agreement due to the strain it
could place on electricity generators).
47. See DePalma, supra note 22; see also Barry G. Rabe et al., State Competition as a
Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 32 (2005) ("Tradi-
tionally, climate change mitigation policies have been seen as a limitation on industry,
mainly because mitigatory regulations impose extra costs on individual firms for techno-
logical upgrades.").
48. DePalma, supra note 22.
49. Id. New York and New Jersey argued that caps "are not needed to protect custom-
ers and can dampen incentives to develop cleaner alternatives." Id.
2007]
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III. CALIFORNIA'S CO2 EMISSIONS LEGISLATION
A. Assembly Bill 1493: Taking a Hard Line on Tailpipe
Emissions
Until 2002, the overwhelming majority of state global warming
legislation addressed CO 2 emissions from stationary sources.
Many of these laws took shape over a number of years; the RGGI,
for instance, evolved from a series of regional discussions and
even included a "stakeholder process" whereby soon-to-be-
regulated businesses and environmental organizations could give
state representatives substantive feedback about the cap-and-
trade program.5 ° Efforts such as the RGGI "involved a relatively
quiet process of policy development and consensus building, nur-
tured by state agency officials."51 On July 22, 2002, however, for-
mer California Governor Gray Davis turned up the volume on
global warming legislation when he signed Assembly Bill ("AB")
1493 into law.5
2
The California government had decided it could only stomach
federal inaction but for so long, and AB 1493 signified a crack-
down on the transportation industry's munificent contribution to
CO 2 emissions.5 3 The law charged the California Air Resources
Board ("CARB") with developing "regulations that achieve the
maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles."54 CARB's regulations, written in
50. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Stakeholder Process, http://rggi.org/
stakeholder.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). The initial stakeholders ranged from electric-
ity behemoths such as Dominion and Entergy to left wing environmental organizations
such as Environmental Defense. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Stakeholder
Process: Stakeholder Member Organizations and Lead Representatives, http://rggi.org
stakeholder member.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
51. RABE, supra note 39, at 143.
52. Id. at 141-42.
53. Id. at 142-43. ("[T]he California [law] reflects a more traditional and adversarial
style of environmental policymaking. It represents a familiar divide between environ-
mental groups and auto manufacturers 'in a clash reminiscent of their first collisions more
than three decades ago.'") (quoting Carl Ingram, Senate Votes to Require Cleaner-Running
Cars, Light Trucks, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2002, at B8)). Scientists estimate that transporta-
tion sources account for one-third of CO, emissions in the United States. See Union of Con-
cerned Scientists, California Regulates Global Warming Emissions from Motor Vehicles,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean -vehicles/vehicles-health/californias-goba-warming-vehi cle-
law.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). In California, 41% of CO, emissions come from the
transportation sector. See id.
54. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West 2006).
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200455 and scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2006, "set near-
term emission standards, phased in from 2009 through 2012, and
mid-term emission standards, phased in from 2013 through
2016. "56 If implemented, the rules would eventually cut green-
house gas emissions from automobiles by thirty percent. 57 Before
CARB's regulations may take effect, however, California has a le-
gal hoop through which it must jump and a court battle which it
must win. California must secure a regulatory waiver from the
federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and prevail in
a lawsuit against several automobile dealers and manufacturers
who have challenged the regulations' validity. "
B. Crossing the First Bridge: California's Waiver Request
California's stature as a figurehead of progressive environ-
mental legislation derives from its ability to independently regu-
late motor vehicle emissions, notwithstanding federal regulation.
When Congress passed the CAA in 1970, it prohibited states from
"adopt[ing] or attempt[ing] to enforce any standard relating to the
control of emissions from . . . new motor vehicle engines."5 9 Con-
gress granted itself plenary power to create motor vehicle emis-
sions standards, with one exception. It waived the application of
this prohibitory provision for "any State which ha[d] adopted
standards . . . for the control of emissions from new motor vehi-
cles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966. "60 Only
California qualified under the CAA's section 209(b) waiver provi-
55. See Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 53.
56. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD., REQUEST FOR A CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION
209(B) WAIVER OF PREEMPTION FOR CALIFORNIA'S ADOPTED AND AMENDED NEW MOTOR
VEHICLE REGULATIONS AND INCORPORATED TEST PROCEDURES TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS: SUPPORT DOCUMENT 6 (2005), available at http://www.arb.ca gov/cc/docs/
att2_support.pdf [hereinafter SUPPORT DOCUMENT].
57. See Sholnn Freeman, States Adopt California's Greenhouse Gas Limits, WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 2006, at Di.
58. See Danny Hakim, Automakers Sue to Block Emissions Law in California, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at C1. The plaintiffs in the lawsuit, styled Central Valley Chrysler-
Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, consist of various California automobile dealerships, General
Motors Corporation, DaimlerChrysler Corporation, the Tulare County Farm Bureau, and
the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. No. CV-F-04-6663, 2005 WL 2709508, at *1
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2005) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss and certifying
venue for immediate appeal).
59. Clean Air Act § 209d(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000).
60. Id. § 209(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1).
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sion because it had regulated automobile emissions since the
early 1960s.61
Over the years, California has utilized its excepted status to
enact innovative laws aimed at environmental protection. It has
passed revolutionary legislation "regarding the use of unleaded
gasoline, catalytic converters, and clean diesel fuel."62 In each of
these cases, California's laws laid the foundation for subsequent
federal action "to establish a more uniform standard for the na-
tion."63 Moreover, the fact that any other state may adopt Cali-
fornia's emissions standards as long as "such standards are iden-
tical to the California standards for which a waiver has been
granted" places California in an extremely powerful legislative
position.64
Even in the absence of federal regulation, there exists a realis-
tic possibility for AB 1493 to significantly reduce CO2 emissions.
Ten other states-Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jer-
sey, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Oregon, Rhode Island,
and Washington-have already passed or will soon adopt their
own version of AB 1493.65 The combined number of vehicles in
these states amounts to roughly "a third of the national passen-
ger vehicle market."66 If more states follow California's lead, AB
1493 has the potential to make a marked impact in slashing
global CO2 emissions. On the other hand, if the EPA denies Cali-
fornia's waiver, ten other states fail along with California.
1. Fighting an Uphill Battle
As long as California's legislation is at least as stringent as the
federal standard, the EPA may only deny a California waiver re-
quest for one of three reasons: (1) if California's "determination
... is arbitrary and capricious;" (2) if California "does not need
61. See RABE, supra note 39, at 142.
62. Id. For a brief chronology of landmark California air pollution laws, see NOW Air
Wars: California's Auto Emissions Laws, Apr. 15, 2005, http://www.pbs.orgnow/index.
html (search "Air Wars," then follow hyperlink).
63. See RABE, supra note 39, at 142.
64. Clean Air Act § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
65. See Environment: Three More States To Adopt California Emissions Law (Dec. 23,
2005), http://www.channel4.com/4car/news/news-story.jsp?newsid=13634&ref=archive.
66. Union of Concerned Scientists, Automakers v. the People: Engineers, not Lawyers,
Should be the Solution to Global Warming Pollution, http://www.ucsusa.orgclean-vehi-
cles/avp (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
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such ... standards to meet compelling and extraordinary condi-
tions;" or, (3) if California's "standards and accompanying en-
forcement procedures are not consistent with"67 the EPA's author-
ity to regulate "emission[s] of any air pollutant."6" Though the
EPA has granted more than forty of California's waiver requests
over the past three decades,69 a recent administrative decision by
the EPA indicates that it may issue a rare denial.
In 2003, the EPA denied a group of petitioners' request for the
EPA to promulgate national standards to reduce CO2 emissions
from motor vehicles. 70 The petitioners claimed that section
202(a)(1) of the CAA compelled the EPA to regulate CO2 emis-
sions from automobiles,71 because CO 2 was "caus[ing], or con-
tribut[ing] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare."72 In denying the petition-
ers' request, the EPA concluded that it lacked authority under the
CAA to regulate CO2 emissions from mobile sources.73 The EPA
found that, in light of "consistent congressional action to learn
more about the global climate change issue before specifically au-
thorizing regulation to address it, the CAA cannot be interpreted
to authorize such regulation."74 The EPA could very easily extend
this rationale to California's waiver request by arguing that if the
CAA does not authorize the EPA to regulate C0 2, then it pre-
empts California from regulating it as well.75 Moreover, the
67. Clean Air Act § 209(b)(1)(A)-(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(A)-(C).
68. Id. § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
69. Letter from Twenty-One Senators to The Honorable Stephen L. Johnson, Admin-
istrator, Environmental Protection Agency (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://feinstein.
senate.gov/06releases/pavley-ltr.pdf.
70. Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, (Envt'l Prot. Agency Sept. 8, 2003).
71. Id. at 52,923.
72. Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
73. See Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 52,928.
74. Id. The petitioners appealed the EPA's determination to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which upheld the EPA's decision. See Massachu-
setts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The petitioners further appealed to the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on June 26, 2006. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d 50,
cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (June 26, 2006) (No. 05-1120.) The Court will issue an opin-
ion during the 2006-2007 term.
75. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 295 (2003) ("Because the federal government does not, and under
the Bush Administration's analysis cannot, regulate greenhouse gas emissions .. . , the
argument would conclude that California cannot regulate such emissions . . . , and there-
fore that the California regulations are subject to the broad CAA preemption provision.").
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EPA's reasoning aligns with the third statutory criteria for a de-
nial-that California's enforcement procedures conflict with the
EPA's authority to regulate air pollutants.76
The EPA might buttress its denial on the second statutory cri-
teria-that global warming's potential effects on California's en-
vironment and population do not rise to the level of "compelling
and extraordinary conditions" that section 209(b) appears to de-
mand.7 Under this line of reasoning, the "rising sea levels, de-
creased snowpack and spring runoff, and more severe weather
and wildfires" 78 that California could experience are no different
than problems that other states might have to confront in a hot-
ter climate.
Nevertheless, California has a variety of counterarguments at
its disposal to refute a waiver denial. One such argument is sim-
ply to carry the EPA's "no authority to regulate" contention to its
logical conclusion. Although the CAA prohibits states from regu-
lating CO2 "'emissions' . . . without qualification," 9 California
could plausibly argue that if the EPA does not consider CO 2 an air
pollutant, then a motor vehicle's CO 2 output does not qualify as
an "emission""0 under the CAA."' If this argument suffices, Cali-
fornia need not apply for a waiver at all.
With respect to the second statutory criteria, California con-
tended in its waiver application that section 209(b) does not re-
quire it to demonstrate that AB 1493 is necessary to combat
"unique threats from greenhouse gas emissions."82 California as-
serted, rather, that "[t]he relevant inquiry ... is whether Califor-
76. See Clean Air Act § 209(b)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(C).
77. See id. § 209(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(B); Carlson, supra note 75, at 297
("[Tihe EPA may counter that the hardships California could experience as a result of ris-
ing temperatures are not so different from those faced by other states.").
78. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dis-
miss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint at 1, Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v.
Witherspoon, No. CIV F-04-6663 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://www.cal
cleancars.org/legal/ARB-pts-%20author-mtb030705.pdf. In a report prepared for the
President, the National Research Council predicted that climate change would result in
"decreased snow pack and/or earlier season melting." CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at
19. The Council noted that the "western part of the nation," not only California, "is highly
dependent on the amount of snow pack and the timing of the runoff." Id. at 19-20. The
Council's findings militate in favor of an EPA denial grounded on the second criteria.
79. Carlson, supra note 75, at 296.
80. See Clean Air Act § 209(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).
81. See Carlson, supra note 75, at 295-96.
82. SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 56, at 16.
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nia needs its own emission control program to meet compelling
and extraordinary conditions, not whether any given standard is
necessary to meet such conditions." 3 Thus, in California's view,
as long as its "unique geographical and climatic conditions" jus-
tify its excepted status under the EPA, it meets the second statu-
tory criteria enumerated in section 209(b). 4
Notwithstanding the validity of California's assertions, the
EPA will probably turn a deaf ear to California's arguments be-
cause its 2003 denial intimates that it opposes any sort of regula-
tory regime for CO2 emissions.8 " California could, however, seek
review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia if the EPA denies its waiver.86
C. Crossing the Second Bridge: Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep,
Inc. v. Witherspoon 7
In addition to procuring its waiver request, California must
prevail in a federal lawsuit filed by automobile dealers and manu-
facturers who vehemently oppose tailpipe CO2 emissions regula-
tion. 8 The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California on December 7, 2004, seek-
ing to block CARB's regulations from taking effect.8 9 The plain-
tiffs offered a slew of reasons why the regulations were invalid.
They alleged, among other things, that the regulations "are pre-
empted by the fuel economy standards set under the Energy Pol-
icy and Conservation Act, which instructs that states not enforce
any rule related to fuel economy standards [and that they] are
preempted by the CAA, absent a waiver approved by [the]
EPA."9° These preemption claims are especially dangerous for
83. Id. at 15.
84. Id. at 16; see Clean Air Act § 209(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(B).
85. See Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52, 922 (Envt'l Prot. Agency Sept. 8, 2003).
86. See Clean Air Act § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
87. No. CV-F-04-6663, 2005 WL 3470653 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2005). The trial, sched-
uled to last approximately twenty days, is currently docketed for January 16, 2007.
Scheduling Conference Order at 15, Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon,
No. CV-F-04-6663 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2005), available at http://www.calcleancars.org/le
gal/SchedulingConferenceOrder_9-20-05.pdf.
88. See Hakim, supra note 58.
89. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, No. CV-F-04-6663, 2005 WL
2709508, at *1 (E.D. Cal. filed Dec. 7, 2004); see Hakim, supra note 58.
90. ROBERT MELTZ, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, GLOBAL WARMING: THE LITIGATION
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California, because they cut to the heart of California's status as
an independent emissions regulator under the CAA.91
1. First Claim: Federal Law Preempts Any Attempt by
California to Control Fuel Economy
The plaintiffs' first claim alleges that increasing the fuel econ-
omy of motor vehicles represents the only realistic method by
which auto manufacturers could slash CO2 tailpipe emissions.92
Because, however, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
("EPCA") explicitly prohibits states from enforcing laws "related
to" fuel economy standards,93 the plaintiffs claim that this piece
of federal legislation impliedly preempts California from enacting
state legislation aimed at CO2 emissions reduction.94 The federal
government, through the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration ("NHTSA"), weighed in on the debate, and, not sur-
prisingly, sided with the plaintiffs.95 The NHTSA, the agency
charged with setting the national Corporate Average Fuel Econ-
omy ("CAFE") standards,96 essentially echoed the plaintiffs' ar-
gument that the only effective way to decrease CO 2 tailpipe emis-
sions is by making automobiles increasingly fuel efficient.97 The
NHTSA concluded that "because there is but one pool of technolo-
gies for reducing tailpipe CO2 emissions and increasing fuel econ-
HEATS UP 10 (2006), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06AprRL/
32764.pdf (footnotes omitted). For a downloadable version of the plaintiffs' first amended
complaint, see California Clean Cars Campaign, Legal Challenges: Court Documents &
Background, http://www.calcleancars.org/legal/court-docs.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
91. See generally Carlson, supra note 75 (predicting and analyzing the preemption
arguments likely to arise in Witherspoon).
92. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 12, Central
Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, No. 1:04-CV-6663 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2005),
available at http://www.calcleancars.org/legal/court-docs.html (follow "Amended Com-
plaint Part 1" and "Amended Complaint Part 2" hyperlinks).
93. See 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) ("When an average fuel economy standard prescribed un-
der this chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or
enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy
standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard.").
94. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 92, at 12.
95. See CAFE Rule Suggests EPA Likely to Deny California Greenhouse Waiver,
CLEAN AIR REP., Apr. 6, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 5705082.
96. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a).
97. See Average Fuel Economy Standard for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 71
Fed. Reg. 17,566, 17,654 (Dep't of Transp. Apr. 6, 2006) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts.
523, 533, 537).
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omy available now and for the foreseeable future, regulation of
CO 2 emissions and fuel consumption are inextricably linked."9
Environmental organizations countered the plaintiffs' argu-
ment by noting that California gained its special status under the
CAA before Congress passed the EPCA.99 These groups therefore
contended that the EPCA "explicitly requires [the] NHTSA take
California's auto emission standards into account when setting
CAFE standards."100 In essence, supporters of California's law
maintain that statutory incongruity does not require AB 1493's
invalidation. The plaintiffs' first count represents the most sig-
nificant hurdle for California, as the statutory language of the
EPCA explicitly empowers the NHTSA with deciding the "maxi-
mum feasible average fuel economy" for motor vehicles. 10'
2. Second Claim: The CAA Preempts California from Regulating
CO 2 Tailpipe Emissions
In light of the NHTSA's view that the EPCA preempts Califor-
nia from enacting de facto emissions standards, as well as the
EPA's conclusion that it lacks authority to regulate CO, gener-
ated from mobile sources, the district court might very well hold
that the CAA preempts California's ability to regulate CO2 emis-
sions from automobiles. The plaintiffs' argument parallels that
which the EPA utilized in its 2003 Notice of Denial-when Con-
gress created the CAA, it did not intend for the EPA to regulate
CO0 2. 1 2 Thus, if the EPA does not have the authority to regulate
CO 2 emissions from motor vehicles,"0 3 this jurisdictional void "pre-
cludes California from adopting any new motor vehicle emission
standards for carbon dioxide or greenhouse gases."104 California
can employ similar arguments to those it asserted in its waiver
request, but the district court might be hesitant to issue a ruling
that clashes with the EPA's stance on CO 2 emissions.
98. Id.
99. AUTO INDUSTRY CLAIMS IN LAWSUIT SEEKING TO OVERTURN CALIFORNIA'S
HISTORIC GLOBAL WARMING REGULATION 1, http://www.calcleancars.org/legal/auto-claims.
pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
100. Id.
101. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (emphasis added).
102. First Amended Complaint, supra note 92, at 41-42.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 70-76.
104. First Amended Complaint, supra note 92, at 41.
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D. If California Prevails, What Will AB 1493 Accomplish?
If they take effect, the rules promulgated by CARB will force
auto manufacturers to develop advanced technology in order to
limit fleet tailpipe emissions. But with technological advance-
ments such as hydrogen-powered vehicles and hybrid cars stead-
ily developing, the question arises whether AB 1493's aggressive-
ness is necessary. Such technology includes fuel cell vehicles,
which combine hydrogen with oxygen to create the electricity that
would power the automobile. °5 Though hydrogen cars might be
part of a long-term solution to global warming," 6 the technology
and the infrastructure needed for the materialization of a viable
hydrogen vehicle market lies decades away.1" 7 Likewise, in the
policy arena, many states currently offer tax and transportation
incentives for hybrid owners to encourage the sale and use of hy-
brid vehicles. 108 Although states' efforts are well intentioned, hy-
brid cars do not appear to be a short-term solution either. One es-
timate predicts that hybrid cars will constitute a mere 4.1% of the
national automobile market six years from now. 0 9 These tech-
105. See Matthew Peak, Improper Incentives: Modifying the California Zero Emission
Vehicle Mandate with Regards to Regulatory, Technological, and Market Forces: 1990-
2001, 7 GEO. PUB. POLY REV. 137, 142 (2002) (describing the mechanics of a hydrogen ve-
hicle).
106. See, e.g., Department of Energy, Energy Sources: Hydrogen, http://www.energy.
gov/energysources/hydrogen.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) ("Hydrogen in the long-term
will simultaneously reduce dependence on foreign oil and emissions of greenhouse gases
and criteria pollutants.").
107. A representative from the California Fuel Cell Partnership opined that the United
States is '"still a good 25-50 years away from seeing significant saturation of a hydrogen-
refueling infrastructure.'" Peak, supra note 105, at 149. In California, Governor Schwar-
zenegger has promised to invest $100 million to create a "hydrogen highway." See Rabe,
supra note 47, at 38 (citing Carla Marinucci, Recall Spotlight on Appeals Court; HECK-
LED: Actor Tries to Court Environmentalists Amid Protest, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2003, at
Al). Hydrogen refueling stations would lie every twenty miles along the highway, "allow-
ing motorists to buy clean-burning hydrogen-fueled vehicles without fear they will run out
of gas." Id.
108. For instance, New Mexico gives hybrid vehicle purchasers a one-time exemption
from the motor vehicle excise tax and state sales tax, see HybridCars.com, Hybrid Incen-
tives and Rebates-Region by Region, http://www.hybridcars.com/local-incentives/region-
by-region.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006), while Virginia allows hybrid vehicles to use the
HOV lane regardless of the number of passengers in the car. See VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-
46.2(A)(6) (Supp. 2006). Unfortunately, hybrid owners' HOV privilege in Virginia expires
on July 1, 2007. See id. Hybrid owners who are dissatisfied with the time limitation on the
Virginia statute should consider moving to Florida, where no expiration date exists for a
similar privilege. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.0741(4) (West 2006). For a brief fifty-state and
Canadian survey of hybrid incentives, see HybridCars.com, supra.
109. See Miguel Llanos, Carmakers Eye Green Pastures, Jan. 4, 2006, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/9762170 (referencing a J.D. Power study that predicts hybrids will con-
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nologies and consumer incentives are years away from main-
stream viability and only nominally reduce CO2 emissions in the
short term.
Though automakers prefer tax incentives to regulation,"' Cali-
fornia refuses to leave the choice in the hands of the consumer. In
delineating the boundaries of CARB's regulatory authority, the
legislature emphasized "the longstanding technology-forcing role
of California regulation."' The California legislature specifically
prohibited the CARB from: (1) imposing a tax "on any motor vehi-
cle, fuel, or vehicle miles traveled;" (2) banning the sale of any
"vehicle category," such as sport utility vehicles; (3) requiring a
"reduction in vehicle weight;" (4) reducing speed limits; or (5) lim-
iting "vehicle miles traveled."" 2 AB 1493's focus on short-term
technological innovation reflects the California legislature's un-
willingness to wait patiently for technology to develop at its own
pace. By mandating strict, across-the-board emissions standards
for all 2009 model automobiles sold in California, AB 1493 virtu-
ally guarantees that all Californians will eventually buy envi-
ronmentally friendly vehicles. Admittedly, this guarantee does
not come without an economic downside for consumers. The tech-
nological modifications auto manufacturers must make to meet
AB 1493's emissions standards will augment the purchase price
of automobiles sold in California. "1
3
In 2009, CARB predicts that passenger cars and large trucks
will, respectively, cost $17 and $36 more." 4 By 2016, the last year
of the mid-term emissions standards, this price increase will
climb to over $1000 for both classes of vehicles." 5 The long-term
cost advantages that result from AB 1493, however, could poten-
stitute 4.1% of new vehicles by 2012).
110. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers stated that "'[cionsumer tax incentives
can help spur sales of [hybrid] vehicles. ... The government should not pick winners and
losers, but rather let consumers and the marketplace choose which technologies make
sense for them."' Automakers Take California's Climate Emissions Rule to Court, ENVTL.
NEWS SERV., Dec. 8, 2004, http://www.globalexchange.org/warpeacedemocracy/oil/2766.
html.
111. Air Resources Board, California Environmental Protection Agency, Climate
Change Emission Control Regulations (Dec. 10, 2004), http://arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/cc-
newfs.pdf.
112. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(d) (West 2006).
113. See Air Resources Board, supra note 111.
114. See id.
115. See id. Industry experts claim that the technological improvements will increase
the price of automobiles by $3000, not $1000. See NOW, supra note 62.
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tially offset this one-time price increase. The emissions reduction
technology will most likely result in "operating cost" savings
which will make vehicles more fuel efficient.'16 After subtracting
the average consumer's monthly car loan payment from monthly
fuel expenditures, CARB discovered that consumers will save
anywhere from $3.50 to $7.00 per month. 1 7 These savings will
add up over time to offset a portion of the increased purchase cost
of vehicles sold in California. Although consumers will not ex-
perience tremendous long-term savings, ever-increasing gasoline
prices should make any gain in fuel efficiency all the more attrac-
tive.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal government's unwillingness to pass legislation that
would reduce CO 2 emissions has ushered in a new era of global
warming regulation. The regulatory responsibility has devolved
to state governments, and so far, many states have made valiant
efforts to reign in CO 2 emissions. The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative represents the most expansive of these attempts. The
seven states that comprise the RGGI have proven that interstate
cooperation is possible, although only time will tell if this regional
endeavor can succeed. When examining the RGGI, we must re-
calibrate our idea of success. In evaluating the RGGI, we should
not consider actual CO 2 emissions reductions a factor dispositive
of success. Instead, we should focus on the effectiveness of the
cap-and-trade system and watch closely to see if retail electricity
prices remain relatively stable. As long as the RGGI serves as a
building block for other regional efforts to control emissions from
stationary sources, it has served its purpose.
116. See Air Resources Board, supra note 111. The phrase "cost-effective," as used in
the context of AB 1493, refers to "greenhouse gas reductions that are economical to the
owner of the vehicle, taking into account the full life-cycle costs of the vehicle." Pew Center
on Global Climate Change, Greenhouse Gas Standards for Vehicles, http://www.pewcli
mate.org/states.cfm?ID=51 (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding
the costs to consumers, "a July 2004 survey by the nonpartisan Public Policy Institute of
California found that 81 percent of Californians support the law." Natural Resources De-
fense Counsel, California Global Warming Emissions Rule: Legal Precedent Favors New
Tailpipe Standard Despite Automaker Gripes (July 2004), available at http://www.calclean
cars.org/factsheets/NRDC-0704.pdf.
117. See Air Resources Board, supra note 111.
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The fight against mobile sources of CO 2 looks less promising,
but AB 1493 remains a hopeful endeavor. California utilized its
special status under the CAA to pass this piece of legislation, and
other states have followed its lead. The barriers to AB 1493's suc-
cess, however, are immense, and the legislation's opponents are
formidable. If CARB's regulations manage to outlast a waiver re-
quest and a lawsuit, it would signify a tremendous victory for
champions of global warming regulation.
As we move into an age where states carry the heavy burden of
combating climate change, the effectiveness of subnational regu-
lation remains uncertain. Efforts such as the RGGI and AB 1493
cannot effectively substitute for federal global warming regula-
tion, but they can serve as regulatory models that the federal
government can consult when it is forced to address climate
change. In this manner, when the federal government finally con-
fronts climate change, it can hit the ground running.
Michael H. Wall
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